A Rant.. Microsoft’s Own software and SQL Server Permissions: A Security concern That is a real nuisance for DBAs
A Rant.. Microsoft’s Own software and SQL Server Permissions: A Security Concern That is a real nuisance for DBAs
Introduction:
How many times have you heard the phrase “Microsoft best practice”? For many DBAs, it often rings hollow. We’re used to developers requesting sysadmin permissions to sidestep issues, sometimes out of laziness or convenience, but the real challenge often comes not just from our own developers or COTS packages, but from Microsoft’s own products.
Microsoft’s installers frequently request sysadmin rights during setup — even if only temporarily. While this might seem necessary for some installations, it raises serious security concerns. Once granted, these permissions can lead to changes that DBAs may not fully understand or be able to track. This post explores why Microsoft’s approach conflicts with the security principles it advocates and why it’s a major challenge for database administrators.
The Challenge: Sysadmin Permissions During Installation
Many Microsoft products, from System Centre to SharePoint and Exchange, rely on SQL Server for backend storage. However, their installation processes often demand sysadmin permissions for service accounts. While this ensures a smoother installation, it ignores the principle of least privilege that Microsoft promotes in other areas.
Convenience vs. Security
Granting sysadmin access during installation may be the easiest way to avoid permission-related errors, but it introduces security risks. Even if permissions are revoked after installation, DBAs are left with uncertainty about what changes were made. This lack of visibility creates concerns over potential security vulnerabilities.
A Disconnect with Best Practices
Microsoft promotes least privilege as a core principle across its platform. Yet, in its own products, especially those that integrate with SQL Server, this principle is often overlooked. By requesting sysadmin privileges during installation, Microsoft’s own tools undermine the very best practices they encourage.
The Risks of Excessive Permissions
Granting unnecessary elevated privileges, even temporarily, creates risks that extend beyond installation.
Lingering Security Threats
Changes made with sysadmin privileges, such as creating new accounts or altering configurations, can persist even after elevated access is revoked. These changes can introduce vulnerabilities that may not be immediately apparent.
Increased Attack Surface
An installer with sysadmin privileges has complete control over the SQL Server instance. If compromised, these accounts can provide attackers with full access to sensitive data and system configurations, putting the entire environment at risk.
A Call for Change: Improving Installation Practices
Microsoft has an opportunity to lead by example. Here’s what could be done to improve:
1. Respect Least Privilege
Installers should request only the minimum necessary permissions. If elevated privileges are required, there should be full transparency on what’s needed and why.
2. Transparent Installation Processes
Microsoft should make clear what changes are being made during the installation process. This would allow DBAs to verify that no unnecessary or insecure modifications were introduced.
3. Consistency Across Products
If least privilege is a best practice, Microsoft should ensure that it applies across all of its products, including those that rely on SQL Server.
What DBAs Can Do
While we wait for improvements from Microsoft, that will probably never come, DBAs can take steps to mitigate the impact:
Audit Permissions: After installation, review and adjust permissions to minimise security risks.
Monitor Changes: Use SQL Server’s auditing features to track changes made during installation.
Advocate for Better Practices: Push for secure installation practices that respect least privilege and transparency.
Conclusion: Sysadmin Privileges Should Be Reserved for DBAs
At the end of the day, sysadmin permissions should only be granted to DBAs. You wouldn’t give me schema admin on Active Directory to install software, so why should I give you sysadmin? If there are legitimate tasks that require such elevated privileges, they should be separated from the installer and scripted, so that we can review and execute them ourselves. Installers should stay within the context of what’s actually needed for the installation process. The literal definition of least privilege. Being too clever or overreaching with privileges compromises the security of the entire system. It’s time for Microsoft to rethink how these permissions are requested and provide a more secure, transparent, and manageable approach.
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